On 29 June 2026, the final day of the substantive hearing in the DeSoto case took place before the District Court of The Hague. The hearing was devoted to the submissions of the injured parties, the prosecution’s reply to the defence, the defence’s rejoinder, and the suspect’s final statement before the Court.

Statement by the injured parties
The hearing opened with submissions by the lawyers representing the injured parties. Counsel informed the Court that five of their nine clients had travelled to the Netherlands to attend the previous week’s hearings. They emphasised that the victims continue to hold a nuanced view of the suspect as a human being, a position which, according to counsel, deserves recognition and respect despite the seriousness of the allegations.

The injured parties responded to two central arguments advanced by the defence. First, they rejected the suggestion that the victims’ statements had been coordinated or influenced and were therefore unreliable. Secondly, they disputed the defence’s argument that the suspect could not have committed the alleged crimes because of his Tutsi identity and that he had, in fact, protected members of the Tutsi community during the genocide. According to the injured parties, they do not regard the suspect as Tutsi and have never witnessed him carrying out acts of protection or assistance. On the contrary, they described him as having humiliated them and provided several examples of such conduct. The victims’ counsel questioned what possible interest the victims would have had in fabricating these allegations before the investigating judge.

The lawyers further explained that the victims had hoped the suspect would acknowledge the facts, look them in the eye, and ask for forgiveness. Although that hope had not been fulfilled, they stressed that the victims had not lost faith in humanity and continued to place their trust in the Court. As one of the victims expressed it, “The truth will reach its destination.”

Functional immunity and admissibility of the civil claims
The injured parties then addressed the legal issues surrounding functional immunity and the admissibility of the civil claims. They argued that the defence had merely referred to case law on functional immunity without providing any substantive legal analysis. In response, counsel questioned whether the criminal court had jurisdiction to determine the victims’ civil claims and submitted that the defence had failed to demonstrate why it would not.

They also challenged the defence’s argument that adjudicating the compensation claims would place a disproportionate burden on the criminal proceedings. According to the injured parties, the defence had not shown that it lacked sufficient time to study the case file or question witnesses. Counsel noted that, in practice, the defence had raised only limited questions concerning statutory interest. The size of the case file alone, they argued, cannot justify declaring the claims inadmissible. Nor had the defence explained how it had been prejudiced or why additional expert evidence would be required.

Applicable law, causation and damages
Turning to the applicable law, the injured parties addressed the temporal scope of the Rome II Regulation and referred to Articles 3 and 7 of the Dutch Act on Conflict of Laws in Tort (WCOD). They argued that Rwandan law applies to the claims without reservation.

With regard to causation and joint and several liability, counsel submitted that the defence had unnecessarily complicated the legal analysis. Under Rwandan law, they argued, liability does not depend on the precise number of perpetrators involved or the specific role played by each individual. The fact that others may also have contributed to the harm does not preclude joint and several liability.

According to the injured parties, the causal link lies in the suspect’s deliberate participation in the conduct that caused the victims’ harm. They emphasised that the compensation claims had been carefully limited to the acts charged in the indictment. The victims seek compensation for two categories of material damage and two categories of non-material damage, while no compensation is claimed for events falling outside the indictment period. Counsel explained that the material damages had been specifically substantiated and that the non-material damages had been assessed conservatively, including by reference to Swedish case law.

The injured parties also rejected the defence’s submission that the victims had already received compensation in Rwanda. According to counsel, this is incorrect. The material losses can be established with precision on the basis of the property that was looted or destroyed. Travel expenses are supported by medical records and documentation relating to psychological treatment. Counsel further argued that while the existence of an affective relationship may be relevant to the amount of compensation awarded, it does not need to be specifically proven in order for a claim to exist.

Concluding their submissions, the lawyers for the injured parties argued that the Court is fully capable of determining the claims. In their view, the amount of compensation can be assessed on the basis of reasonableness and fairness, without requiring the development of any new legal principles.

Reply of the Public Prosecution Service
The prosecution opened its reply by addressing the defence’s general approach to the assessment of the evidence. According to the prosecution, the defence had focused almost exclusively on challenging the reliability of the incriminating witnesses while failing to assess the evidence as a whole. The prosecutor argued that witness statements should not be analysed in isolation but within the broader evidentiary framework. In its view, the defence had adopted what it described as a “piecemeal approach”, comparing individual categories of witnesses against one another rather than considering the consistency and interconnected nature of the evidence.

The prosecution then responded to the defence’s submissions regarding de auditu statements. While acknowledging that courts, including in the Merens case (name of the investigation), have approached such evidence with caution, the prosecution argued that de auditu statements are not automatically inadmissible. Rather, they may be relied upon where they are corroborated by other evidence or where they themselves provide support for other witness testimony.

Turning to the manner in which witness statements had been obtained, the prosecution rejected the defence’s suggestion that interviews had taken place in an environment favourable to the prosecution or that interview locations had been bugged. According to the prosecution, no evidence supports these allegations, and Rwandan authorities were not present during any of the hearings conducted by the investigating judge. The prosecutor further noted that concerns regarding the soundproofing of interview rooms had proved unfounded. Out of more than thirty witness hearings conducted by the investigating judge, only one instance involved a voice being heard from an adjacent room.

The prosecution also addressed concerns regarding contact between witnesses. It explained that the fact that two witnesses had briefly stayed at the same hotel had been entirely coincidental and that they had been separated shortly afterwards. In the Rwandan context, where many locations lack street names and personal telephones, the exchange of contact details between witnesses was described as unremarkable and not indicative of coordination or collusion.

A significant part of the prosecution’s reply was devoted to the fourteen theories advanced by the defence to challenge the reliability of the incriminating witnesses. According to the prosecution, the defence had presented numerous speculative explanations for why the incriminating evidence should be disregarded, while offering little explanation as to why the exculpatory witnesses should automatically be regarded as reliable.

The prosecution rejected the allegation that the case stemmed from a personal vendetta between two families, arguing that such a dispute was irrelevant to the charges contained in the indictment. It likewise dismissed the suggestion that witnesses had merely associated the suspect with the crimes because of his position as responsable, stressing that the witnesses’ accounts were based on their own observations rather than on assumptions linked to his official function.

The prosecutor further argued that the suspect’s membership of the MDR political party served only as contextual information and did not constitute an independent basis for criminal responsibility. Similarly, the fact that the suspect fled Rwanda after the genocide was described as unsurprising given that more than two million people left the country during that period. The prosecution also rejected the argument that the criminal investigation had been politically motivated by the suspect’s later involvement with the FDU political party in Kinigi, pointing out that his political activities postdated the extradition request and that the investigation had not been initiated because of his opposition activities.

The prosecution further submitted that the passage of more than thirty years since the events does not automatically undermine the reliability of witness testimony. While acknowledging the challenges associated with historical investigations, the prosecutor stressed that memory loss alone cannot justify disregarding otherwise credible evidence. The prosecution also cautioned against relying on cultural stereotypes to explain alleged inconsistencies, arguing that although witnesses may sometimes exercise self-censorship, there were no concrete indications that this had occurred during the investigation.

Addressing additional defence theories, the prosecution argued that there was no basis for concluding that witnesses had felt unable to speak freely. On the contrary, thirty-three witnesses had referred to the suspect spontaneously, without his name first being mentioned by investigators. Similarly, the possibility of source contamination through the Gacaca proceedings had been expressly examined during witness interviews. The prosecutor also rejected arguments that discussions between witnesses in prison, their alleged moral responsibility, or the prospect of compensation rendered their testimony unreliable. According to the prosecution, none of these factors, either individually or collectively, undermined the credibility of the evidence. Overall, the prosecution characterised the defence’s fourteen theories as speculative and unsupported by the evidence.

The prosecution then turned to the relationship between the suspect and the exculpatory witnesses relied upon by the defence. It noted that the nine principal defence witnesses all had close personal or family connections either to the suspect himself or to individuals closely associated with him, including Felix and conseiller Sekindi. These witnesses included the suspect’s former wife, her close neighbour and friend, Felix’s wife, the suspect’s son, a close neighbour, two sisters related to conseiller Sekindi, another uncle, a witness who reportedly received financial support from the suspect, and former tenants of his land. According to the prosecution, these close personal relationships were relevant when assessing the weight and reliability of their testimony within the overall evidentiary picture.

The prosecution also addressed the defence’s argument that several witnesses had confused the suspect with a police officer sharing the same first name. After examining the relevant statements, the prosecutor argued that the only overlap concerned the common first name and that there was no evidence that witnesses had actually mistaken the two individuals.

Finally, the prosecution rejected the defence’s allegation that the suspect had himself been abducted during the relevant period. According to the prosecutor, none of the witnesses was able to confirm that such an abduction had occurred. Several witnesses no longer remembered the alleged incident, while another specifically stated that the suspect had not been taken away on the day in question. The prosecution therefore considered this account implausible.

Looting, destruction of property and witness evidence
The prosecution then turned to the allegations concerning the looting and destruction of Tutsi-owned property. Responding to the defence’s argument that the locations of the relevant houses had not been sufficiently identified, the prosecutor explained that many of the houses had been destroyed during the genocide and could therefore no longer be reliably traced. The prosecution also noted that several witnesses identified by the defence had ultimately not been heard by the investigating judge.

The defence had challenged the evidence on four principal grounds: that witnesses would not have been able to recognise the suspect during the looting; that their descriptions of his appearance and movements were inconsistent; that the witnesses had influenced one another; and that the suspect had an alibi. According to the prosecution, each of these issues had been carefully examined during the investigation and put to both incriminating and exculpatory witnesses. Having considered the evidence as a whole, the prosecution maintained that these objections did not undermine the reliability of the witnesses or the overall evidentiary picture.

Nexus with the armed conflict and co-perpetration
The prosecution next addressed the defence’s argument that the alleged offences lacked the necessary nexus with the armed conflict. It argued that the violence formed part of the broader armed conflict that accompanied the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and that the alleged acts could not be viewed in isolation. The prosecutor rejected the defence’s comparisons with events such as Kristallnacht or the COVID-19 riots, submitting that these analogies failed to reflect the nature of the conflict in Rwanda. Rather, the prosecution characterised the violence as part of a coordinated campaign carried out by the government against the Tutsi population, referring in this regard to the explanatory memorandum to the Dutch International Crimes Act (WIM).

The prosecution further emphasised that the indictment is based on the concept of joint perpetration in close and deliberate cooperation, rather than on a failure to intervene. According to the prosecution, criminal responsibility does not require that the suspect personally committed every criminal act. It is sufficient if he actively participated in the group, took concrete steps to facilitate the crimes, and deliberately encouraged or supported their commission.

The events at Byiza Stadium
The prosecution also replied to the defence’s arguments concerning the events at Byiza Stadium. One exculpatory witness had stated that he did not see the suspect at the stadium. According to the prosecution, this observation was of limited significance given the circumstances at the scene. The stadium had been overcrowded and chaotic, making it entirely plausible that an individual present there would not have been seen by every witness. The prosecutor therefore argued that the absence of the suspect from one witness’s perception does not establish that he was absent from the stadium altogether.

The prosecution likewise responded to questions raised by the defence concerning witness testimony that the suspect had received grenades. According to the prosecutor, the explanation was straightforward: the relevant witness stated that he personally observed the suspect distributing grenades. In the prosecution’s view, this account was therefore based on direct observation rather than speculation or hearsay.

Civil claims of the injured parties
Finally, the prosecution addressed the defence’s objections to the civil claims submitted by the injured parties. In relation to the applicable law, the prosecutor argued that the defence’s reliance on functional immunity was misplaced and that there was no obstacle preventing the criminal court from adjudicating the claims. The prosecution noted that courts in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands have consistently taken a different approach from that advocated by the defence, demonstrating that there is currently no settled rule of customary international law supporting the defence’s position.

The prosecution further submitted that the claims had been sufficiently substantiated, were specific in scope, and had been responsibly quantified. Accordingly, it requested that all civil claims be declared admissible.

Defence rejoinder
The defence opened its rejoinder by recalling the overall framework of the case. Counsel emphasised that the suspect is charged with four counts relating to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi: 

• Counts 1 and 2: Violation of the laws and customs of war in April 1994, including looting, destruction of property, and arson of homes.
• Count 3: Incitement to genocide in April 1994, with the intent to destroy the Tutsi population.
• Count 4: Deliberate participation in genocide in April 1994, by killing or causing serious bodily harm to members of the Tutsi population.

The defence reiterated that the suspect denies all allegations and maintains that he did everything within his power to protect Tutsi civilians during the genocide, while also suffering personal losses, including the deaths of members of his own family. Counsel further reminded the Court that the case has been pending for many years, following eleven pro forma hearings and an investigation resulting in a case file comprising thousands of pages.

Turning first to Counts 1 and 2, relating to looting and destruction of property, the defence argued that the prosecution had relied on an overly broad and generalised portrayal of the suspect’s role. According to counsel, although some witnesses stated that they had been encouraged to participate in the looting, none had testified that they had been forced or compelled to do so. The defence therefore submitted that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the looting formed part of a centrally organised State policy.

The defence further maintained that, by the time of the events described in the indictment, the suspect no longer exercised any meaningful authority within the local community. Counsel referred to numerous witnesses who stated that he no longer held influence over local events and argued that there is no evidence demonstrating that he led, directed or organised the attacks. While the prosecution continues to portray the suspect as a person of authority, the defence submitted that this characterisation finds no support in the evidence. According to counsel, the incriminating witness statements are inconsistent and unreliable and therefore cannot support a conviction on the first two counts.

The defence then addressed the charge of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. According to counsel, the prosecution’s case rests almost entirely on the assumption that the suspect’s former position as responsable of the Basi sector automatically conferred authority and influence upon him throughout the events of April 1994. The defence rejected this premise, arguing that following the events of 6 April 1994 the existing administrative structures had effectively collapsed. In those circumstances, the authority traditionally associated with the position of responsable had ceased to exist, and the prosecution had failed to produce concrete evidence demonstrating that the suspect exercised any directing or leadership role during the relevant period.

Counsel subsequently turned to the allegations concerning Byiza Stadium, which form the basis of the genocide charge. The defence argued that the prosecution had failed to establish the suspect’s presence at the stadium beyond reasonable doubt. According to counsel, the witness evidence is characterised by significant inconsistencies concerning the suspect’s alleged location, his movements within the stadium, and the sequence of events. Several witnesses placed him near the entrance, while others referred to locations behind the stands without clearly explaining what those descriptions meant in practice. The defence submitted that these discrepancies make it impossible to reconstruct with certainty where the suspect was or whether he was present at all.

Particular attention was devoted to the allegation that the suspect threw a grenade into the stadium. Counsel argued that the various witness statements differ considerably regarding the number of grenades involved, the suspect’s precise location, and the circumstances in which the alleged incident occurred. These inconsistencies, according to the defence, seriously undermine the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence. The defence further noted that seven witnesses stated that they had not seen the suspect in Mbazi during the relevant period, while other witnesses had either retracted or substantially qualified earlier incriminating statements.

The defence maintained that the overall body of evidence demonstrates that the suspect sought to protect Tutsi civilians rather than harm them. According to counsel, several witnesses described him as risking his own safety in an attempt to protect members of his family and other Tutsi residents, despite the fact that members of his own family were themselves killed in Mbazi. On that basis, the defence requested the Court to acquit the suspect of the genocide charge in its entirety.

The defence also challenged the compensation claims submitted by the injured parties. Counsel argued that the claims were based on an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law, submitting that the Dutch Act on Conflict of Laws in Tort (WCOD), rather than the Rome II Regulation, should govern the assessment of the applicable law. According to counsel, the amounts claimed, particularly in relation to damages for the loss of an affective relationship, had not been sufficiently substantiated and should therefore be declared wholly or partially inadmissible.

In its concluding submissions, the defence argued that the case is marked by numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in the witness evidence. While acknowledging that the events took place more than thirty years ago, counsel submitted that the central issue remains the suspect’s alleged presence at Byiza Stadium, which, in the defence’s view, has not been established by reliable evidence. The defence further argued that several incriminating witnesses admitted not remembering important details and stated that the prosecution was selectively relying on incriminating testimony while dismissing exculpatory evidence. According to counsel, the prosecution had effectively “cherry-picked” the evidence supporting its theory of the case while disregarding witness statements favourable to the defence.

The defence concluded that the evidence falls well short of the standard required for a criminal conviction and therefore requested the Court to acquit the suspect on all charges.

Final statement of the defendant
The suspect concluded the hearing by exercising his right to make a final statement before the Court. He began by expressing his sorrow for the atrocities committed during the genocide in Rwanda, describing the events in Mbazi as deeply tragic and explaining that it had not been easy to revisit those memories throughout the proceedings.

The suspect firmly denied having played any role in the crimes charged. He stated that it had been extremely difficult to listen to the allegations made against him, particularly those accusing him of participating in killings and throwing grenades at Byiza Stadium. According to the suspect, the violence was carried out by military forces rather than civilians, and he insisted that he had never possessed any weapons. He also referred to the difficult circumstances in which everyone was struggling simply to survive during that period.

The suspect further emphasised that members of his own family had been killed during the genocide. Rejecting the allegations against him in the strongest terms, he stated that he was not “a savage animal” capable of murdering his own relatives. Addressing the judges directly, he thanked the Court for hearing the case and expressed his confidence that the truth would ultimately prevail. He concluded by asking the Court to use its wisdom in assessing the evidence and to acquit him, stating that he, too, considered himself a victim of the events.

The presiding judge subsequently closed the hearing and announced that judgment will be delivered on 28 August 2026 at 10:00 a.m.

On 24 June, the sixth day of the substantive hearing in the DeSoto case, the defence had its closing argument (pleidooi). The defence devoted significant attention to its account of events in Mbazi in 1994, the role played by several local figures in protecting Tutsi residents during the genocide, and an extensive challenge to the reliability of the witness testimony relied upon by the prosecution and the legal representatives of the injured parties.

A first part of the defence’s argument concerned the situation at roadblocks in Mbazi during 1994. The defence cited a number of witness statements indicating that no Tutsi residents were killed at roadblocks in the area, and argued that the roadblocks themselves had been established years before the genocide, in some accounts as early as 1990, originally to keep out armed infiltrators rather than to target the Tutsi population. On the question of weapons training, the defence argued that such training had been organised by military and communal authorities for the purpose of preparing young men to assist the army, rather than to facilitate violence against Tutsi civilians. The defence characterised witness accounts describing firearms training given to youths as inconsistent and rooted in rumour, and submitted that this allegation should not form part of the charges.

The defence also addressed meetings said to have taken place in Mbazi in the run-up to the genocide, including a large gathering of around 2,000 men, among them Tutsi residents. According to witness accounts cited by the defence, attendees were told at this meeting that no Tutsi should be killed.

With respect to the accused himself, the defence presented testimony from several witnesses describing efforts to protect Tutsi residents, including assistance with replacement identity documents and direct intervention against attackers. The defence noted that attackers who had targeted one family were struck on the forehead so they could later be identified. Identity cards were taken from attackers, on the accused’s request. The defence addressed a number of statements implicating the accused in violence against that same family, arguing that these statements originated from individuals with a personal grievance against him and were unreliable. The defence further submitted that the accused was himself at risk during the genocide: although his identity documents listed him as Hutu, some considered him to be Tutsi and several of his relatives were killed. The defence argued that the prosecution’s position, that the accused both protected Tutsi residents and participated in the genocide, could not be reconciled.

A substantial part of the day’s hearing was devoted to the defence’s framework for assessing the reliability of witness statements. The defence argued that several structural factors undermine the statements made against the accused. It submitted that the accused’s position as responsable was a largely unpaid, voluntary local administrative role. This had led witnesses and others to presume that he must have known of, and contributed to, the genocide, without this being supported by direct evidence in his individual case. The defence drew a similar conclusion regarding his membership of the MDR party (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), arguing that members of political opposition movements have routinely faced accusations of genocide participation in Rwanda, including individuals who are themselves known to have protected Tutsi residents. The defence also argued that the accused’s departure from Rwanda after the genocide had been treated by some witnesses as evidence of guilt in itself.

The defence further pointed to the considerable passage of time, now 32 years, since the events in question, arguing that witnesses’ memory may have merged personal experience with information learned later from others. It raised cultural and linguistic factors, submitting that Rwandan communication norms make it difficult to answer questions with a direct no, that witnesses may feel pressure to give answers they believe are expected of them, and that some may add detail rather than acknowledge gaps in memory. The defence also argued that the broader political climate in Rwanda restricts witnesses’ freedom to give statements that diverge from the official account of the genocide. They pointed to concerns some witnesses expressed about possible fear of the consequences of testifying favourably to the accused.

Finally, the defence addressed the risk of mutual influence between witnesses, linked in particular to the Gacaca justice process introduced in Rwanda in 2001 and the contact between detained individuals before and during the making of statements. The defence argued that detainees were able to discuss the events of the genocide. This included the role that the accused had. Before writing their own statements they discussed the events together. This was appealing since reduced sentences were available to those who named co-perpetrators. Defence pointed to two individuals that made some of the earliest and most detailed incriminating statements about the accused. They argued that their statements shaped those given by other witnesses during the Gacaca proceedings. On this basis, the defence concluded that the great majority of the statements against the accused should be treated with substantial caution, and submitted that certain statements should be excluded from the evidence altogether.

On the charge of looting and destruction of property in the Mbazi area, the defence argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the accused’s involvement to the required standard. According to the defence, witness statements concerning the meeting that allegedly preceded the attacks were too inconsistent to establish that the accused was present, let alone that he played any organising role. Some witnesses placed him at the meeting but recalled that he said nothing; others who attended stated that they did not see him there at all. The defence argued that this category of evidence, given more than thirty years after the events, was inherently unreliable, citing contradictions between witnesses as to the accused’s location, what he was wearing, where the looting took place, and whether he carried any weapon.

The defence further argued that, even on the witness accounts most favourable to the prosecution, the accused was at most seen accompanying the attackers without speaking, chanting, drumming, or otherwise directing the violence. Other witnesses stated that he was at home when properties were set on fire. The defence noted that some accounts described attacks being staged or feigned, with perpetrators looting while local leaders attempted to identify and stop them. Counsel also pointed to an alibi: the accused’s ex-wife, along with other residents and survivors of both the Mbazi and Byiza Stadium events who had had no further contact with the accused, stated that he had been at home on the day of the attacks.

On the distribution of the looted goods, the defence submitted that no witness placed the accused at the markets where stolen property was sold, and that several witnesses stated they had not seen him at all during this period. The defence argued that mere presence or association, without active participation, could not establish complicity, and that no witness had described the accused ordering, directing, or carrying out any killing.

The defence then addressed the legal threshold for criminal liability. Counsel argued that the standard applied by the International Criminal Court, and reflected in the lower limit of liability under Dutch law, was in places more demanding than the standard the prosecution sought to apply in this case. The defence submitted that the requirements for co-perpetration were not met: the accused had no superior authority over others, his role as responsable carried only minimal practical power, and he lacked the capacity to prevent the violence once it began. Counsel argued that the chain of command above the local level collapsed after the president’s plane was shot down, after which it was no longer possible for local administrators to convene meetings or exert control.

Turning to the accused’s standing in the community, the defence rejected the prosecution’s characterisation of him as an influential leader. The accused had worked as a teacher in the area and, the defence argued, held comparatively little prestige or authority. According to his ex-wife’s evidence, he carried no particular responsibility in the early stages of the genocide. The defence argued that neither the accused, the mayor, nor the conseiller was able to restrain the looters, and that the population at large acted as though no rules applied to them. While the defence acknowledged that looting in the area proceeded on the instructions of another figure to whom people listened, it maintained that the accused was not among the leaders directing events and that even Sakindi had ultimately been compelled to act alone. The defence argued that the perpetrators were by that stage uncontrollable, that armed groups linked to political parties carried out killings using grenades, and that the accused could not be held responsible for acts committed by others over whom he had no authority. Counsel submitted that no evidence showed the accused expressing any intent to destroy the Tutsi population.

On the charge concerning Byiza Stadium, the defence argued that the gathering of refugees there was understood at the time as a measure for their protection rather than a prelude to violence, and that the accused had no knowledge that those who assembled would be killed, though he stated he had sensed that something was wrong. The defence grouped the witness evidence into three categories: statements placing the accused at the stadium as an active participant, which the defence characterised as implausible and internally inconsistent; statements describing him as present but inactive, which the defence said were contradicted by other testimony; and statements asserting that he was not present at all, which the defence submitted were the most credible. Counsel argued that the inconsistency running through the first two categories undermined the reliability of the accusation as a whole, and noted that the defence had submitted extensive investigative material in support of its position.

The next hearing is scheduled to continue on 29 June 2026.

On 23 June 2026 the fifth day of the substantive hearing in the Desoto case took place before the District Court of The Hague.

The hearing was devoted to the prosecution’s closing argument in the case concerning alleged crimes committed by the accused during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The prosecution reviewed the evidence gathered during the investigation, addressed legal issues raised by the defence, discussed the reliability of witness testimony, examined each charge in detail, responded to the victims’ compensation claims, and concluded by requesting a sentence of life imprisonment.

At the outset of the hearing, the prosecutor emphasised the importance of accountability in genocide cases. He acknowledged that establishing the truth more than thirty years after the events is challenging but argued that it is by no means impossible. The prosecutor stated that genocide in Rwanda was not a natural disaster but a crime conceived and carried out by people. According to the prosecution, the accused has consistently portrayed himself as a victim while failing to account for his own alleged actions. Referring to one victim’s statement, the prosecutor noted that while those who were murdered can never be brought back, seeing a suspect brought before a court and confronted with the consequences of his actions can provide a measure of relief for survivors.

The prosecution then reviewed the origins of the investigation. Dutch authorities opened a criminal investigation after receiving information and evidence from Rwanda, including witness statements and other materials. The prosecutor stressed that the investigation was not based solely on evidence previously collected in Rwanda. Dutch investigators interviewed dozens of witnesses themselves, while additional witnesses were heard by the investigating judge. Telephone records, documentary evidence, and other materials were also examined. The prosecution acknowledged that historical records from Rwanda, including archives of the former Gacaca courts, were sometimes difficult to interpret due to their age and condition. The prosecutor also noted that concerns had been raised regarding certain aspects of defence investigations, although no evidence had been found that witnesses had been improperly influenced by the accused.

The prosecution placed the allegations within the broader context of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. According to the prosecutor, large numbers of Tutsi civilians fled their homes and sought refuge at Byiza Stadium. The prosecutor argued that the mass killings that followed formed part of a wider campaign aimed at the destruction of the Tutsi population. The Court was reminded that hundreds of thousands of people were killed during the genocide and that a large majority of Rwanda’s Tutsi population was murdered.

Before turning to the facts, the prosecutor addressed several legal arguments raised by the defence. The prosecution rejected the argument that the charge of direct and public incitement to commit genocide was time-barred. According to the prosecutor, Dutch law had criminalised the conduct in question long before the current legislation entered into force and later legislative changes merely modernised the legal framework without creating a new offence. The prosecution also argued that the crimes were sufficiently connected to the armed conflict in Rwanda to qualify as war crimes and maintained that Dutch law on co-perpetration provides the appropriate framework for assessing the accused’s role. The prosecutor emphasised that direct physical participation is not required where a suspect plays a significant organising, coordinating, or leadership role.

A substantial part of the hearing focused on witness evidence. The prosecution repeatedly acknowledged the challenges associated with testimony given more than three decades after the events. Factors such as trauma, cultural differences, memory loss, and discussions among witnesses were considered. However, the prosecutor argued that such factors do not automatically undermine reliability. The prosecution stressed that many witnesses consistently distinguished between what they personally observed and what they had learned from others. While some statements were used only partially and others were excluded entirely because of significant inconsistencies, the prosecution maintained that the overall body of evidence was reliable and mutually reinforcing.

The prosecution devoted considerable attention to the position of the accused within the local community. According to the evidence presented, the accused was an educated man who held a position of authority and enjoyed considerable respect. Witnesses described him as someone who exercised influence over local residents, chaired meetings, settled disputes and supervised community affairs. The prosecution argued that he was also politically active and was regarded as a prominent figure within local political structures. 

According to the witness statements, the accused’s influence increased during April 1994. Witnesses described him as a leader whose instructions were followed and whose presence carried significant weight. The prosecution argued that his role during the genocide differed from his earlier administrative functions because he allegedly used the authority he had accumulated before the genocide to mobilise civilians and direct anti-Tutsi actions once the violence began.

The prosecution then turned to the allegations relating to looting and destruction of property. According to witness testimony, meetings were held before attacks on Tutsi-owned homes in the Mbazi area. Witnesses described gatherings at various locations where participants were instructed to begin what was referred to as “the work.” According to the prosecution, drums and whistles played a crucial role in mobilising participants. The prosecutor argued that drums carried the same meaning as whistles: they signalled that “the work” had begun. Witnesses described this “work” as the looting, destruction, and burning of Tutsi homes.

The prosecution argued that large groups subsequently moved through Tutsi neighbourhoods, looting homes, stealing livestock and personal belongings, and destroying property. Witnesses described songs being sung as the groups advanced. Particular attention was given to the song “Tubatsembatsembe.” According to the prosecution, both survivor and perpetrator witnesses consistently explained that the phrase meant “let us exterminate them all” or “let us wipe them all out.” The prosecutor argued that the song was sung publicly and repeatedly during the attacks and that its meaning was unmistakably directed at the Tutsi population. Witnesses also described other anti-Tutsi songs and chants associated with killings.

According to the prosecution, multiple witnesses placed the accused at these events. Several witnesses described him as participating in meetings beforehand, giving instructions, directing participants, supervising the attacks, and later overseeing the distribution of looted property. The prosecution argued that although witness accounts varied on certain details, they consistently portrayed the accused as one of the leaders accompanying the attack groups. Witnesses described him carrying symbols identifying him with the attackers and moving with the groups as homes were looted and destroyed.

The prosecutor also discussed the charge of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. According to the prosecution, anti-Tutsi slogans, songs, and statements were made publicly during the attacks. Witnesses described calls to eliminate Tutsi people and references to Tutsi civilians as enemies. The prosecution argued that the song “Tubatsembatsembe” formed part of this incitement. The prosecutor stressed that the drumming, chanting, and public statements were not isolated expressions but were accompanied by organised violence against Tutsi civilians. According to the prosecution, the accused played an important role because he allegedly ordered that drums be brought to the gathering and because his leadership position lent authority and legitimacy to the messages being communicated. Even if it could not be established that he personally sang every song or uttered every statement, the prosecution argued that his role in organising and facilitating these events made him criminally responsible as a co-perpetrator.

The largest part of the hearing concerned the events at Byiza Stadium. According to the prosecution, thousands of Tutsi civilians had gathered there seeking protection. Witnesses described meetings held before the attack in which local residents were instructed to go to the stadium. According to the prosecution, civilians were mobilised to surround the stadium while soldiers carried out attacks using firearms and grenades.

The prosecutor argued that the accused’s role at the stadium differed from his role during the earlier looting attacks. During the looting operations, the prosecution portrayed him primarily as an organiser, coordinator, and leader who mobilised civilians and supervised attacks on homes. At the stadium, however, the prosecution argued that he moved beyond organising and became directly involved in the killings themselves.

According to the prosecution, witnesses saw the accused at multiple stages of the events. Witnesses described him being present when civilians gathered around the stadium, when the cordon was established, during the attacks themselves, and afterwards when bodies were removed. The prosecution argued that the civilians surrounding the stadium formed a cordon designed to prevent escape. Witnesses described people attempting to flee being forced back toward the stadium through the throwing of stones and other acts intended to maintain the enclosure. According to the prosecution, the purpose of the cordon was to ensure that the victims remained trapped while soldiers fired weapons and threw grenades into the crowd.

The prosecution further argued that the accused personally gave instructions at the stadium and that several witnesses described him carrying grenades. According to the prosecutor, witness testimony established that he threw at least one grenade into the stadium and may have possessed additional grenades. The prosecution maintained that these actions constituted direct participation in the killings. Witnesses also described seeing the accused after the attacks, including during the removal and disposal of bodies. According to the prosecution, his continued presence during these stages further demonstrated his involvement and authority.

The prosecutor rejected the accused’s account that he merely observed events from a nearby hill before returning home. According to the prosecution, this explanation is contradicted by numerous witness accounts placing him at the stadium throughout the course of the attacks and their aftermath. The prosecution argued that the evidence demonstrates not only presence but active leadership, coordination, and participation.

The hearing also addressed compensation claims brought by survivors and relatives of victims. The prosecution argued that survivors suffered profound material and emotional harm. Homes were destroyed, property was looted, livelihoods were lost, and many families were permanently torn apart. The prosecution argued that the accused’s alleged leadership role was sufficient to establish legal responsibility for these consequences and supported the full award of compensation sought by the victims.

In its final submissions on sentencing, the prosecution described the crimes as among the gravest offences known to law. The prosecutor referred extensively to the continuing suffering experienced by survivors, including trauma, grief, depression, anxiety, and the loss of educational and economic opportunities. The prosecution noted that many survivors described the events of 1994 not as distant history but as something that continues to affect them every day.

The prosecution also addressed the personal circumstances of the accused. While acknowledging that the accused suffers from PTSD and had built a stable life in the Netherlands before his arrest, the prosecutor argued that these factors should not reduce the sentence. According to the prosecution, the accused was a 34-year-old teacher and influential community leader at the time of the genocide who consciously chose to use his authority to encourage and facilitate violence. The prosecution further argued that his age and the hardship of detention do not outweigh the exceptional gravity of the crimes.

Concluding its submissions, the prosecution stated that it considers all charges proven, including genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and war crimes consisting of looting and destruction of property. The prosecutor argued that the scale of the killings, the accused’s alleged leadership role, his direct participation at Byiza Stadium, and his continued refusal to accept responsibility leave no room for any sentence other than life imprisonment.

The prosecution therefore formally requested that the Court impose a sentence of life imprisonment.

1. Victims’ Right to Speak

On 22 June 2026 the fourth day of the substantive hearing in the Desoto case took place before the District Court of The Hague.

The hearing day began with the victims exercising their right to speak. Their statements, presented through previously recorded video testimonies, focused on the contrast between their lives before and after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 

Before 1994, the victims’ lives consisted of family, work, and possessions such as homes and livestock. After 1994, almost nothing remained. The victims lost spouses, parents, brothers, sisters, children, and other relatives. Their homes, livestock, and other property were also destroyed or lost. One victim stated: “I lost my husband, my brothers, sisters, and all my relatives.” Another described being left a widow with young children: “Life became terrible [after the events], but I received help. Rebuilding began little by little. I continued living with little energy and few resources. Being a widow with young children is extremely difficult.”

The victims also spoke about the horrific circumstances in which they lost their loved ones. One woman described how she found her father after the genocide: “When I went there, I found my father in his uniform and coat at the place where they had killed him. Dogs were eating him, his bones were visible. I could not bury him, so I covered him with grass.” Others explained how they had to collect and wash the remains of family members before burying them: “It is painful and traumatic because they did not die from illness, but were murdered by people just like themselves.”

The statements made clear that the consequences of the genocide have never disappeared. Many victims continue to suffer from trauma, insomnia, flashbacks, and depression. One victim stated: “April [the month dedicated to the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide] takes me back, and I feel traumatized.” (…) “I remember how people were shot, how they screamed, how the sounds could be heard from the village, and how bombs were falling.” Some explained that they can hardly sleep because of recurring nightmares. “Sleeping sometimes feels pointless because it leads to nightmares.”

A recurring theme in the victim’s statements was the loss of family and the absence of a social support network. One victim said: “The trauma I have is having no family.” Another explained: “When you have brothers and sisters, you can visit one another and older relatives can help you. But they have all died.” According to the victims, the pain of that loss has never disappeared. “The pain never goes away. When you are with people and talking, you forget it a little.”

The victims emphasized that they carry the consequences of the genocide with them every day. As one of them put it: “We carry everything with us to this day. (…) The day the killing stopped, and the rain had dried, our tears began to flow.”

2. Message to the Accused

Nearly all victims also addressed the accused directly. Their central message was that he should take responsibility for his actions, tell the truth after 32 years, and stop contesting the allegations brought by the Public Prosecutor. The victims called upon the accused to honestly explain what happened, what role he played, and with whom he cooperated.

Several victims stated that they do not seek revenge. However, they believe that the accused should acknowledge his guilt, show remorse, and ask for forgiveness. Some pointed out that, as an influential person, he bore responsibility and could have warned or protected people. It was also emphasized that, more than thirty years later, the victims are still waiting for the full truth to emerge.

According to the victims, the accused, just like themselves, still has the freedom to choose what attitude he adopts. In their view, the only appropriate attitude is to take responsibility and tell the truth. The sentence imposed on the accused should be based on the law. Finally, some victims expressed the wish to look the accused in the eye.

In response, the accused stated that he did not have much to say at this stage. He acknowledged that what happened was horrific and requested the Court to examine the matters carefully and thoroughly, bearing in mind that he “was also a victim himself”. The accused stated that it is now up to the Court to study the case carefully and reach its judgment. He further expressed satisfaction that several injured parties were present so that they could follow the proceedings taking place in court.

The victims requested the Court to take into account the gravity of the genocide and the lasting suffering it caused. Many asked for a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the crimes, and some requested financial compensation. They emphasized that no amount of money can bring back the lives that were lost, but that compensation can provide recognition of their loss and suffering. Several victims expressed appreciation that the case is being heard in the Netherlands.

3. The Victims’ Lawyer

With regard to immunity and jurisdiction, the victims’ lawyer primarily argued that genocide constitutes a violation of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens). Acts amounting to genocide cannot be regarded as acts covered by functional immunity.

The lawyer further argued that Rwandan Law is applicable. The Constitution of Rwanda provides that genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are not subject to any statute of limitations.

The victims’ claims primarily concern material damage (loss of homes and livestock), psychological damage (fear and trauma), and damage resulting from the loss of family members (non-material or moral damage under Rwandan law). In the alternative, the lawyer requested the Court to assess the damages on an equitable basis.

According to the lawyer, the amounts claimed have been calculated conservatively. Where damage was difficult to prove, claims were either omitted or based on minimal assumptions in order to avoid complex evidentiary disputes while also taking into account the accused’s financial capacity.

According to the victims, the loss of livestock and property goes beyond their financial value and material damage alone; it also means the loss of a home, safety, security, and livelihood. The animals formed part of the family’s daily life. The victims had worked hard for many years to acquire these resources, which were essential for supporting their families.

Regarding non-material damage, the victims stated that they have suffered for many years from fear, uncertainty, grief, and psychological distress. According to the lawyer, the spread of genocidal ideology and incitement to genocide denied the victims’ right to exist and made them feel that their lives were worth less.

For victims JN2, EK1, and BN, compensation for moral damage was sought as direct victims of genocide. They had been present in the stadium and managed to remain hidden, unlike dozens of their relatives. They continue to live with the knowledge that their family members were brutally murdered without any opportunity to say goodbye.

The lawyer emphasized that no financial compensation can ever make up for the loss of parents, children, or other loved ones, but that compensation can provide recognition. In assessing the amount of damages, reference was made to a previous Swedish case. No statutory interest is being claimed.

During the third hearing in the criminal trial in the DeSoto investigation, the Court examined allegations concerning the massacre at a stadium in Rwanda, where thousands of Tutsi refugees were gathered during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. A central issue in the hearing was the accused’s alleged role in the stadium attacks, including claims that he was present during the massacre, participated in the violence, and distributed or used hand grenades against civilians sheltering there.

A significant part of the hearing focused on the scale and sequence of the attacks at the stadium. The Court referred to differing estimates of the number of refugees present, ranging from around 3,000 to as many as 5,000-7,000 people, and discussed reports that most of them were killed. The hearing addressed evidence that soldiers first opened fire on the refugees, after which civilians armed with spears and firearms joined in the assault. The judges highlighted indications of at least two separate attacks on the stadium, one in the morning and another in the afternoon.

The accused was questioned in detail about his account of the events of 25 April. He stated that he went to a hill overlooking the stadium out of curiosity after people had been sent there, saw what was happening from a distance, and then attempted to go down before retreating when soldiers began shooting. According to his account, he then informed another individual, Felix, about the attack and returned home in fear. The judges repeatedly pressed him on inconsistencies between this version and earlier statements, particularly concerning the timing of the events, whether he heard gunfire or explosions, and whether he had gone to the hill before or after learning of the violence.

The hearing also focused heavily on witness testimony placing the accused inside the stadium during the massacre. The judges referred to several witness statements alleging that he was seen among the attackers, armed with grenades, throwing stones, and encouraging the assault. Some witnesses reportedly claimed that he said that nobody should escape, while others described him participating alongside other accused persons as civilians and soldiers attacked the refugees. The accused firmly denied all of these allegations, stated that he had never possessed hand grenades because he feared weapons, and insisted that the witnesses were lying.

Another important issue was the Court’s scrutiny of the accused’s explanation that he remained largely away from the stadium while such large-scale killings were taking place nearby. The judges repeatedly questioned how he could claim limited knowledge of what occurred when he said he had gone to observe events from the hill, had family members in the stadium, and later learned details from others. They also confronted him with apparent contradictions between his statements and those of other individuals, including his ex-wife, neighbours, and people he said were with him that day.

The proceedings also addressed broader allegations about the accused’s conduct during the genocide beyond the stadium massacre itself. The Court discussed claims linking him to local authority and responsibility during the period, including the suggestion that he later helped issue documents or passes to Tutsi civilians attempting to flee. In response, the accused argued that formal authority had collapsed, that he did not regain power, and that any involvement in obtaining passes was purely an effort to help civilians escape violence with the assistance of others, including Felix and military officers.

The hearing further touched on the aftermath of the killings and the wider context of violence in the area. The judges referred to evidence that approximately 3,500 bodies were buried in mass graves in Mbazi commune. The accused denied any involvement in burying the dead and maintained that he only heard about the mass graves from others. He also suggested that military personnel, senior local figures, and other actors were responsible for the killings, though he gave uncertain and incomplete answers when asked specifically about the role of civilians.

A recurring theme throughout the hearing was the accused’s insistence that multiple survivor and witness accounts identifying him were false. The Court questioned why so many witnesses would independently implicate him in serious acts such as participating in attacks, making hostile remarks to survivors, and appearing at key locations during and after the massacre. The accused said he could not explain these accusations except to suggest that some people wanted him imprisoned or were protecting themselves by blaming him.

In the latter part of the hearing, the defence shifted its attention to the accused’s life after Rwanda, including his asylum application in the Netherlands, his family situation, his work caring for elderly people, and his subsequent political activities in exile. The defence presented him as an active member and later chairman of an opposition political party in the Netherlands, involved in organising meetings, protests, fundraising, and campaigns against the Rwandan government. A discussion arose among the defence, prosecution, and presiding judge about the relevance and scope of this line of questioning in relation to the charges.

At the close of the hearing, the Court indicated that the substantive discussion of the charges had been covered for the day and that the proceedings would continue on Monday with matters relating to the injured parties. It was also noted that victims would attend court and that NOS would make recordings.

During the second substantive hearing in the case against the defendent, the Court examined allegations concerning attacks on Tutsi civilians in the Mbazi area of Rwanda during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Central issues included the destruction and pillaging of Tutsi homes, the role of local leaders during the attacks, and allegations that the defendant encouraged or supported violence against Tutsi civilians.

A significant part of the hearing focused on the broader context preceding the genocide. The Court discussed the increasingly polarised political climate in Rwanda, the spread of anti-Tutsi propaganda, and the role played by radio broadcasts and extremist messaging. The defendant acknowledged that broadcasts from stations such as RTLM contained hostile messages directed at Tutsi communities and agreed that certain songs and broadcasts contributed to hatred between Hutu and Tutsi populations.

Particular attention was given to the song Tubatsembatsembe (“let us exterminate them”), an extremist anti-Tutsi song that multiple witnesses have linked to attack groups operating during the genocide. Witnesses have alleged that the song was sung during attacks on Tutsi communities and that local leaders, including the defendant, participated in or tolerated its use. The defendant denied being present during the attacks and denied singing the song, although he acknowledged that it was known among extremist groups at the time.

The hearing also examined allegations relating to organised attacks against Tutsi homes. According to witness statements discussed during the hearing, groups of attackers moved from house to house, looting property, destroying homes, setting buildings on fire, and taking livestock. Witnesses have described the attacks as organised actions carried out under the direction of local leaders. Several witnesses identified the defendant as one of those leaders and alleged that he gave instructions during the attacks. The defendant rejected these allegations and maintained that he was not present and took no part in the attacks.

The judges repeatedly questioned the defendant about his claim that he remained at home while large-scale attacks and destruction were taking place nearby. Referring to witness accounts describing groups of dozens of men moving through the area, accompanied by drums, songs, looting, and arson, the Court expressed difficulty reconciling those events with the defendant’s assertion that he saw very little of what occurred. The defendant maintained that he neither participated in nor witnessed the attacks directly, although he later learned of the destruction and distribution of looted property through other residents.

Another important theme was the systematic pillaging of Tutsi property during the genocide. The hearing addressed evidence suggesting that homes were stripped of possessions, buildings were burned, and looted goods were collected and distributed among perpetrators. The prosecution placed these events within a broader pattern of persecution, arguing that the destruction of homes and livelihoods formed part of the wider campaign against Tutsi civilians.

The Court also discussed several meetings held in Mbazi in April 1994, during which local authorities allegedly abandoned efforts to protect Tutsi civilians and encouraged actions against them. The defendant acknowledged attending a meeting on 21 April 1994 but disputed key aspects of witness testimony concerning statements allegedly made there and his role in the meeting.

Throughout the hearing, the defendant denied participating in attacks, inciting violence, or encouraging the killing of Tutsi civilians. He maintained that he refused calls to join the violence despite pressure from others and argued that witness accounts placing him at the centre of the attacks were incorrect.

The proceedings will continue on the 19th of June at 9.00 am.

Presentation of the case by the Public Prosecution Service

The prosecutors presented the four charges. The legal framework references Dutch case law and the jurisprudence of the Rwanda Tribunal. The attack on the president’s aircraft on 6 April 1994 is identified as the starting point of the genocide. In the Basi region, it took approximately two more weeks before the genocide reached the area where the suspect lived.

Opening response of the defence

The defence outlined the horrific scale of the Rwandan genocide, in which nearly one million people were killed. While not denying these atrocities, the defence disputes that the suspect contributed to the genocide. They noted that the suspect’s own family was severely affected: family members were killed at a bus station. The defendant’s mother belongs to the Tutsi ethnic group.

The suspect is currently held at the psychiatric unit of PI Vught. He suffers from severe depression with flashbacks. The defence requested that the court take this into account, describing him as a broken man.

On the merits, the defence argued that the suspect did everything to protect residents and was not present at the alleged events. None of the witnesses are said to have seen him or observed him doing anything. The genocide unfolded differently in his region, where the population initially resisted. The defence contended that the suspect had no influence over events and would himself have been killed had he been present. Incriminating witness statements are said to have been distorted by various factors. The defence requested full acquittal.

Initial statement of the suspect

The suspect stated that he did not commit any of the acts with which he is charged. He himself lost many family members during the genocide. He expressed the hope that the court will hear the truth: that he did not participate in the events in which his family perished.

Administrative structure and role of the suspect

Today’s hearing focused on establishing the general context in Rwanda during the period in which the alleged offences were committed. The administrative structure of Rwanda was outlined in a context report in the case file. Rwanda was divided into prefectures, communes (municipalities), sectors, and cells, headed respectively by a prefect, a mayor, a conseiller, and a responsable (a local administrative official).

The suspect served as responsable of the Basi sector from 1991 until June 1994. He fulfilled this role on a voluntary basis and was responsible for tasks such as vaccinating children, organising road cleaning, resolving disputes between residents, implementing decisions from higher authorities, and contributing to the social development of the community.

After 6 April 1994, following the shooting down of the president’s aircraft, the authority of the responsables and conseillers collapsed. In neighbouring communes, Tutsi homes were set on fire; Basi remained unaffected for a time. The suspect stated that he and the conseiller organised one or two meetings to calm the population, and that he had the borders of the commune guarded to keep out attackers from neighbouring communes. This was done on the instructions of the mayor, with the cooperation of police and local residents.

Political context and the MDR

The political climate in Rwanda was highly polarised. The suspect was a member of the MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain). Within the party, an anti-Tutsi faction known as MDR Power had emerged. The suspect states that in 1993, following the split, he stepped down from his leadership role, partly because part of his family is Tutsi and because he had observed the divide developing at the national level. In 1994, he claimed to have been merely a supporter without any formal role.

However, multiple witnesses testify that the suspect was involved with MDR Power: he is alleged to have recruited members, organised meetings, distributed cards and caps, and even served as chairman. The suspect firmly denies this. He believes the witnesses are referring to the period before April 1994, or that there has been a misunderstanding.

Timeline – April 1994

• 6 April: Attack on the president’s aircraft; beginning of the genocide at the national level.
• 10 April: Meeting of the prefecture’s security council; instructions issued to organise security meetings and civilian patrols. The suspect was involved in several roadblocks up to 9 April.
• 11 April: The prefect of Butare refuses to attend a meeting of the new government.
• 12 April: On Radio Rwanda, a leader announces that the population should help the army; the prefect of Butare refuses.
• 17 April: Prefects who refuse to carry out the genocide are removed from office and subsequently killed.
• 19 April: Turning point. The president addresses the population of Butare, calling on them not to remain on the sidelines. The suspect stated that he heard the speech and found it alarming that civilians were being called upon to take part. The situation in Basi, which had until then been stable, deteriorated.
• 25 April: Meeting at the stadium. The mayor, the prosecutor, and military personnel were present. The suspect describes this as a kind of call to action, at which point resistance no longer seemed possible.

The stadium meeting and the suspect’s response

Following the president’s speech, the suspect received instructions through his conseiller Sakindi: Tutsi residents were to be brought to the stadium on the mayor’s orders. The suspect stated that he refused, as he had a bad feeling about it. As a compromise, it was proposed that only the small outdoor kitchens and fences of Tutsi homes be set on fire to produce smoke and create the impression of compliance. The suspect states that he objected to this as well.

The suspect testified that, before Sakindi came to him, he had already been told by a family member that the gathering of Tutsi people elsewhere in the country had led to mass killings. He had shared this with Sakindi, who did not believe him. The suspect subsequently went home and, according to his account, maintained his position.

Protection of Tutsi residents

The suspect stated that he attempted to protect Tutsi neighbours, including by bringing them to the home of an acquaintance named Felix. Felix had access to military personnel and had agreed that people in danger could come to him.

He also attempted to arrange replacement identity documents (laissez-passer) for Tutsi residents under his protection, together with the conseiller, including the use of a forged stamp. The suspect stated that he was himself abducted in June 1994 because he had been protecting Tutsi residents, but Felix, with the help of a soldier, secured his release. The details of this abduction were not yet in the case file. The court indicated that it wished to reflect on this and would return to it at a later stage.

Questions from the Public Prosecution Service

The prosecution questioned the suspect about the degree of influence he had retained as responsable after his formal authority had collapsed. His answers indicated that residents and neighbours still listened to him and that he used this influence to discourage people from participating in violence. He stated that young people respected him, though some did not follow his lead.

Regarding his own identity, the suspect had stated to the Dutch immigration authorities (IND) over twenty years ago that he was Hutu, without mentioning his Tutsi relatives. He was unable to adequately explain why he had not disclosed this at the time.

Claims of injured parties and the expert witness question

The lawyers representing the injured parties requested that the court appoint Dr Rosanne van Alebeek as an expert witness, partly in response to the judgment in the Shildon case by the District Court of The Hague, in which the claims of the injured parties were declared inadmissible. The question of functional immunity and the court’s authority to raise legal grounds ex officio has thereby been reopened.

The issue concerns a potentially novel legal question: the civil liability of the suspect in criminal proceedings, in relation to functional immunity under customary international law. The case law in this area is still developing.

The prosecution supports the request for an expert witness at the hearing, as they too have questions. The defence takes the view that the Shildon case differs too significantly from the present case (in terms of the suspect’s role and the charges), that the court is capable of interpreting the law itself, and that substantive debate on civil liability would place an unreasonable burden on the criminal proceedings at this stage. 

The court will deliberate further on the request on the 18th June 2026 at 10. am.

At the pro forma hearing on 24 April at 10:00 before the District Court of The Hague, the court addressed the status of the investigation, paid attention to the exercise of the victims’ right to speak, discussed the pre-trial detention, and dealt with practical matters relating to the substantive hearing.

Status of the investigation

The court discussed the progress of the investigation. A substantial addition of approximately 740 pages has been submitted. All witnesses have now been heard by the investigating judge, and the suspect will not be heard again, except possibly through the International Crimes Team (TIM). One witness examination will still be reviewed on 13 May.

The exchange of written submissions has been delayed, partly due to the Shildon case. The initial target date was 24 April (the day of the hearing), but this was not met; the new target date is 8 May.

The defence requested the addition of a document and that the suspect be heard first through the TIM, preferably at the Penitentiaire Inrichting Vught and with a specific interpreter. The public prosecutor expressed concerns about the working methods of an investigator engaged by the defence but did not oppose the request to add the document. A decision is still pending on the TIM interview and its practical arrangements (location and interpreter).

Exercise of the right to speak and civil claims by injured parties

Regarding the right to speak, counsel for the injured parties indicated that possibly five of the nine victims will travel to the Netherlands to exercise this right. Victims will, in principle, make use of pre-recorded video statements. Those who are present may also speak additionally in person. For elderly victims, additional arrangements are being considered, such as a separate room where they can withdraw.

As for the civil claims of the injured parties, a report is expected in early May on the basis of which the public prosecutor will take a position. The parties will then submit written observations on the legal framework. The defence wishes to respond to both the legal framework and the eventual claims, with a deadline for response set at 5 June.

Pre-trial detention

The defence primarily requested the lifting, and subsidiarily the suspension, of the pre-trial detention. According to the defence, both the investigative ground and the “12-year ground” are no longer applicable, and there are serious objections to the continued detention of the suspect, including concerns about his health.

The public prosecutor opposed this request. While it agrees that the investigative ground is no longer applicable, it maintains that the so-called “12-year ground” (serious disturbance of the legal order in cases involving grave offences such as genocide and war crimes) still applies.

The court rejected the request: the serious suspicions and the 12-year ground remain in place for several of the charges. There are no exceptional personal circumstances justifying suspension. The suspect therefore remains in pre-trial detention.

Practical matters regarding the substantive hearing

The substantive hearing will begin on 17 June at 09:00 and will last several days. Three days have been reserved for the discussion of the facts. The court will provide further details on the exact schedule at a later stage.

During the hearing, audiovisual materials will be used, possibly including 360-degree footage. Both the public prosecutor and the defence will use presentations. The suspect will also be given the opportunity to address certain matters.

Consideration is being given to how witnesses will be identified, in light of privacy and security concerns. A partially public livestream is also envisaged, most likely in English.

Three interpreters (possibly four) will be used (Kinyarwanda – Dutch), with particular attention to discretion. Other practical matters, such as courtroom capacity and the presence of multiple prosecutors, were also discussed.

Finally, deadlines have been set for the submission of documents by the public prosecutor, the injured parties, and the defence. The next substantive hearing has been scheduled for 17 June.

At the pro forma hearing held on 10 February at 10:00 before the District Court of The Hague, the defence’s investigative requests were addressed within the context of the current status of the investigation. The hearing further concerned the anticipated civil claims of the injured parties, a brief discussion of the defendant’s pre-trial detention, and the further procedural planning of the case.

Present at the hearing were representatives of the Public Prosecution Service, defence counsel Dölle, the legal representative of the injured parties, and the defendant.

Status of the Investigation
The Court opened the hearing with an update on the status of the investigation and the most recent additions to the case file. The Public Prosecutor first submitted a request to extend the indictment.

The Court then noted that approximately ten pages had been added to the dossier. The additions include, among other things, the interview of a witness, four video recordings of walking routes, and four video recordings of the stadium. In addition, a report of the investigating judge has been added to the case file, as well as information concerning supplementary expert research. The report of the site inspection is expected to be finalised later this week.

Finally, the Public Prosecution Service confirmed that statements by witnesses have already been circulated among the parties, that two additional witnesses are to be heard later this week, and that four further witnesses are scheduled to be heard during the rogatory mission planned for March.

Defence Investigative Requests
The defence presented its investigative requests. Defence counsel stated that she would not submit a renewed request concerning pre-trial detention, as her objections remained unchanged from the previous pro forma hearing in December and had already been rejected by the Court. She therefore limited her submissions to other investigative requests.

The defence requested the hearing of two witnesses: witness X and witness Y. According to the defence, they could testify that the defendant was not involved in attack groups, that no weapons training took place, and that he, as a Tutsi in hiding, had been assisted by the defendant. Witness Y, the defence submitted, had been present at the distribution of looted goods and could testify as to which individuals were involved.

In addition, the defence requested the inclusion in the case file of a transcript of the Kwibuka podcast, addressing the course of the genocide in the region, as well as a written account of a conversation between an investigator and the sister of E. , who had conducted her own investigation into his alleged betrayal and death.

The defence further indicated that, in its view, consensus exists regarding the subjects for upcoming written submissions, namely:

• jurisdiction;
• the legal framework applicable to the offences charged; and
• all matters relating to the civil claims of the injured parties, including the applicable legal framework.

Position of the Public Prosecution Service
The Public Prosecution Service opposed the defence’s investigative requests. With respect to witness X, the prosecution argued that his potential testimony primarily concerns the murder of J., a fact not included in the indictment, and that the allegation that the defendant may have assisted individuals is not relevant to the assessment of the charges.

As regards witness Y, the prosecution noted that this witness had previously been rejected by the Court due to insufficient substantiation of relevance, and that it remains unclear when and where he was allegedly present at the distribution of goods. The prosecution therefore considered his observations insufficiently specific or relevant to contribute to the assessment of the charges.

The prosecution also objected to the inclusion of a transcript of the Kwibuka podcast and the written report concerning Efrem’s sister, arguing that their relevance to the indictment had not been sufficiently demonstrated.

Defence Reply
In response, the defence argued that the alleged events must be assessed in their proper context. The indictment includes allegations of plundering and destruction of property, which, according to the defence, were carried out by attack groups. The central question, therefore, is whether the defendant belonged to such groups. The defence further emphasised that the defendant is also suspected of co-perpetration of genocide, rendering certain witness statements directly relevant to the charges.

Prosecution Reply
The Public Prosecution Service maintained its opposition to hearing witness Y, stating that the defence appeared to place a disproportionate focus on the attack itself and to suggest that absence from an attack group would negate criminal responsibility.

With respect to witness X, the prosecution stated that if it were indeed the case that the witness had been present at the distribution of looted goods, this would constitute new information that could potentially be relevant. However, given that the investigation is in its final phase, a high threshold applies to the granting of further investigative requests. The prosecution therefore proposed an intermediate step, namely that the defence first submit a transcript of the preliminary interview conducted by the investigator. Only if that transcript demonstrates sufficient relevance could the hearing of witness X be reconsidered. At present, the request was rejected.

Civil Claims of the Injured Parties
The legal representative of the injured parties indicated that she expects to be able to submit civil claims within a foreseeable timeframe. If the applicable Rwandan legal framework permits the exercise of the Right to Speak, 20 May 2026 was identified as a feasible date. At present, two injured parties have expressed a wish to exercise this right, while the legal representative represents a total of ten injured parties.

Should the Right to Speak be legally available, the practical arrangements would be coordinated through the Public Prosecution Service and Victim Support (Slachtofferhulp). The Court noted that the exercise of this right may affect the substantive hearing and must therefore be communicated in a timely manner. In response to a question from the prosecution, the legal representative stated that she hopes to determine by the end of the month whether any injured parties wish to exercise the right to speak via video link, noting practical challenges including language barriers and the organisation of a live connection with Rwanda. The Court explained that live-streaming would require practical arrangements such as interpretation and therefore emphasised the importance of clarity in an early stage.

Court’s Ruling
The Court first ruled that there was no reason to lift or suspend the defendant’s pre-trial detention.

With regard to the investigative requests, the Court held that, at this advanced stage of the investigation, a higher threshold applies to the granting of such requests. The Court found that the defence had failed to sufficiently substantiate the relevance of hearing witness X and Y in relation to the charges. The relevance of adding the podcast transcript was considered insufficient, and the written report concerning E.’s sister was deemed too remote from the facts charged. Consequently, none of the defence’s investigative requests were granted.

As regards potential civil claims, the Court indicated that it would await their formal submission, after which the Public Prosecution Service and the defence would be given the opportunity to respond.

Planning
The next pro forma hearing has been scheduled for Friday, 24 April at 10:00, subject to the availability of the Public Prosecution Service, which indicated that it may seek to reschedule due to another major case the following day; any such request is to be communicated by email.

A series of pro forma and detention-related hearings were held in the criminal proceedings against a 64-year-old man who was arrested in February 2024 on suspicion of involvement in an attack and looting in Gatobotobo, Rwanda, during the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi’s and moderate Hutus. These hearings were procedural in nature and focused on the status of the investigation, outstanding investigative requests, witness-related matters, preparation for the substantive phase of the trial, and the defence request for suspension of pre-trial detention. No substantive examination of evidence took place.

Present at the hearings were representatives of the prosecution, defence counsel (Meester Dulle and Meester Van Straat), the legal representatives of the injured parties, experts from the probation service (reclassering), and the defendant.

The Court opened with a detailed overview of the current state of the case file. The dossier had been supplemented up to nearly item 48.04 and now included, inter alia, reorganised and paginated witness statements, including a revised statement by Jacques Enzi-Nimana; two additional witness statements taken by the TIM in November; records of intercepted telephone communications, confidential communications, and covert access to the defendant’s computer; a media dossier; and a ninth report of the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) with appendices, including decisions on defence requests to hear witnesses.

The Court and prosecution discussed the most recent rogatory mission conducted in November, as well as future investigative travel to Rwanda. Additional rogatory trips were provisionally planned for early February and early March, with a further trip in mid-May reserved as a contingency. It was noted that such planning remains subject to practical uncertainties.

The prosecution stated that, as matters stood, the police investigation itself was complete and that there were no outstanding investigative steps on the part of the police. Some issues remained open at the level of the investigating judge, including amendments to the record of the site inspection (schouw), which the investigating judge would address. The prosecution also raised the question whether it would still be meaningful to hear the defendant once more, noting that such a step would only serve a purpose if the defendant were willing to make a statement.

The defence confirmed that an additional hearing of the defendant would only be meaningful if he were prepared to testify, and otherwise saw no reason for it. The defence further noted that one witness was being maintained as a reserve witness. Attention was drawn to outstanding responses from Professor Longman to additional questions posed through the investigating judge, which were expected imminently. The defence stressed the importance of receiving a definitive indictment as soon as possible in order to properly prepare for the substantive phase and to formulate targeted investigative requests.

A significant portion of the hearing concerned defence requests relating to witnesses and the addition of witness statements to the case file. The defence reiterated requests to hear several witnesses, including individuals previously rejected by the investigating judge, as well as a newly proposed witness described as the son of Emmanuel Sakindi and a direct neighbour of the defendant. According to the defence, this witness could provide first-hand observations regarding the defendant’s conduct, meetings held at his home, the absence of weapons, alleged plundering, and the context of Gacaca proceedings in which, according to the defence, false accusations against the defendant may have been made.

The defence also requested the hearing of witnesses Murekezi and Bonani, who had made incriminating statements, in order to test their accounts. In addition, the defence sought to add two TIM witness statements (Steven Semikabo and Gabriel Ndagishimana), which it characterised as exculpatory and relevant to the assessment of the reliability of other prosecution witnesses.

The prosecution opposed the addition of the TIM statements, arguing that these witnesses were not present at the core events, lacked direct knowledge, and that their statements were not reasonably relevant within the meaning of Dutch criminal procedural law. The prosecution also expressed doubts about their credibility. The prosecution did not object to hearing Murekezi and Bonani, but continued to oppose hearing the neighbour witness, arguing that the relevance of his observations and his proximity to the alleged crimes had not been sufficiently substantiated. With respect to Gacaca proceedings, the prosecution argued that their general functioning and evidentiary value are well known and that Gacaca materials do not constitute independent proof.

The defence maintained all its requests, emphasising that questions of credibility and relevance should be assessed by the Court and not pre-empted, and that alleged false accusations in Gacaca proceedings could bear on the reliability of later witness statements.

No final decisions on these witness requests are explicitly recorded in the provided transcript.

Injured Parties and Applicable Law

The hearings also addressed the preparation of civil claims by the injured parties and the applicable legal framework. Reference was made to correspondence from counsel for the injured parties concerning the application of Rwandan law rather than Dutch law. The Court proposed that the parties exchange written submissions on the applicable legal framework well in advance of the substantive hearings, potentially including expert input.

The defence indicated willingness to respond in writing but requested sufficient time, noting upcoming investigative travel and counsel’s temporary absence. The prosecution expressed a preference to respond after the defence. No binding deadlines were set during the hearing; the Court indicated that further coordination would take place outside the session.

Separately, the Court and counsel discussed practical timelines for the submission of final civil claims. A working arrangement was noted whereby definitive claims would be submitted approximately one month before the substantive hearings, subject to further practical adjustment once hearing dates were fixed.

A substantial and detailed part of the hearings concerned the defence request to suspend the defendant’s pre-trial detention. The Court noted that the defendant had by then been detained for approximately 674 days. A recent probation report was discussed, in which the probation service concluded that it could provide no or insufficient supervision if detention were suspended under the proposed conditions.

The probation expert explained that international contact and location bans could not be effectively monitored, that electronic monitoring would amount in practice to home detention and was considered ineffective in this context, and that digital monitoring of devices was highly limited, infrequent, and easily circumvented. The probation service further indicated that it lacked the authority to conduct in-depth digital inspections and questioned how the police could effectively perform such supervision.

The defence argued that continued detention was disproportionate given the length of pre-trial detention, the expected timing of the substantive hearings (envisaged for June 2026), and the defendant’s personal and psychological circumstances, including depressive episodes and trauma-related complaints. The defence emphasised the defendant’s stable life prior to detention, lack of criminogenic factors, and willingness to comply with extremely strict conditions, including severe restrictions on communication and movement.

The prosecution opposed suspension of detention, maintaining that serious objections and strong suspicions remained, supported by multiple incriminating witness statements, including recent TIM interviews. The prosecution argued that there remained a significant risk of collusion, particularly given that further witnesses were yet to be heard, and referred to intercepted communications in which the defendant allegedly discussed what others should declare. The prosecution also invoked the gravity of the alleged offences and the resulting disturbance of the legal order.

The defence disputed the existence of collusion risk and denied any improper influence on witnesses. Considerable discussion followed regarding the role of the defence investigator in Rwanda, transparency, and whether procedural rules or protocols should be imposed by the investigating judge. The prosecution requested that the case be referred back to the investigating judge with a mandate to establish such rules; the defence resisted this, citing defence rights, safety concerns, and professional privilege.

The record indicates that the Court withdrew for deliberation on the detention request. The final decision on suspension of pre-trial detention is not included in the provided transcript.

The Court and parties confirmed planning for the substantive hearings, provisionally scheduled for June 2026, with specific hearing days allocated for the presentation of facts, civil claims, prosecution submissions, defence pleadings, and final statements.

The next pro forma hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, 10 February at 10:00.

On September 30, a further pro forma hearing took place in the Ntambara (Desoto) case. Present were the prosecution, the defence, the accused, and the lawyer representing the victims. The hearing addressed the accused’s pre-trial detention, the status of the investigation, and the further course of the proceedings.

Since the last hearing, another investigative trip to Rwanda took place. Four witness interviews were scheduled, of which three were completed. The prosecution also indicated that up to three additional witnesses may be added, depending on the relevance of their testimony and whether they can be located. The defence expressed concerns about another addition of new witnesses and the scheduling phase of the trial which is expected to begin in June 2026. The prosecution noted that they will be able to give more clarity on this after the hearing of the witness testimonies in November.

During the previous pro forma hearing, the court asked to have a report by probation services on possible measures and conditions for a potential suspension of detention. The current report was discussed, but the court noted that it was incomplete and requested a more comprehensive version. The defence submitted a motion to suspend the accused’s pre-trial detention, arguing that there are no serious objections and, alternatively, that the legal grounds for detention are lacking. The defence argued this because they argued that there are inconsistencies in the various testimonies. The prosecution, by contrast, maintained that the statements are not as contradictory as suggested by the defence.

The court rejected the defence’s request to suspend the pre-trial detention. It held that there remain serious objections, as multiple witnesses have provided incriminating statements, and that the evaluation of the precise meaning of the witness statements and any possible inconsistencies will be evaluated during the substantive phase of the trial. Finally, the court reiterated its request for a more complete probation report outlining possible conditions and measures for suspension of detention.

The next hearing is scheduled for the 18th of December at 10:00.

On April 17, 2025, a pro forma hearing was held in the Ntambara case, concerning allegations of the defendant’s involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The defendant was not present. The hearing focused on the investigation’s progress, a motion to include new witness testimony, and a renewed request for the suspension of pre-trial detention.

The prosecution reported that four additional witnesses were heard during the March 2025 investigative mission to Rwanda. Due to interpreter shortages, translations of the testimonies are pending and expected by July. In total, fourteen witnesses have now been heard for the defense, with counsel indicating that up to four more may be added depending on ongoing interviews.

A procedural dispute arose over the inclusion of a new witness statement. The defense argued that the testimony contained contradictions relevant to the credibility of other witnesses and could support the defendant’s case. The prosecution objected, claiming the statement lacked exculpatory value and had not been adequately substantiated. The court ruled in favor of the defense, allowing the statement to be added to the case file.

The defense also renewed its motion to suspend the defendant’s pre-trial detention, citing his advanced age, deteriorating health, and the projected length of proceedings. Counsel argued that recent testimonies suggested the defendant had acted to protect individuals during the genocide. The prosecution disputed the defense’s interpretation of the witness statements and maintained that the seriousness of the charges continued to justify detention. The court rejected the motion, holding that the defendant’s personal circumstances did not outweigh the gravity of the allegations.

The next procedural hearing is scheduled for 7 July, 2025, at 12:00.

On February 18, 2025, the District Court of The Hague held a pro forma hearing in the case against the suspect, who is facing charges related to his alleged involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The defendant, currently held in the psychiatric detention facility in Vught, was present.

The hearing focused on the ongoing investigation, which has significantly expanded since Ntambara’s arrest in early 2024. The case file now includes digital evidence, tapped communications, official reports, and documents from Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, a community-based justice system used after the genocide. The examining magistrate confirmed that the investigative phase remains active.

Both the prosecution and defense are scheduled to conduct multiple investigative missions to Rwanda throughout 2025, with trips planned for March, June, September, and November. Approximately fifteen witnesses are expected to be heard. The examining magistrate advised against exceeding this number per trip due to logistical and procedural constraints. The prosecution also indicated that further travel may be necessary in 2026.

The court addressed the translation of Gacaca documents, following the prosecution’s proposal to translate key materials into English instead of Dutch to ease interpretation challenges. The defense did not object, and the court approved this approach.

A key issue raised by the defense involved concerns over the alleged sharing of sensitive defense-related information with Rwandan authorities. The defense argued that personal details of defense lawyers had been shared without prior consultation, potentially compromising their safety. The prosecution maintained that its communication with Rwandan officials was limited to general investigative matters and did not include names or specific case details.

The defense submitted requests for the appointment of two expert witnesses, one specializing in post-genocide governance in Rwanda and the other in the Gacaca justice system. The prosecution objected to one expert, citing a previous denial by the examining magistrate on the grounds that the proposed testimony fell outside legal expertise. For the second expert, the prosecution questioned the necessity of their appointment and suggested an alternative expert, Elaine Dumas, known for her fieldwork in Rwanda and proficiency in the local language.

The defense also submitted a motion for release or, alternatively, a suspension of pre-trial detention, citing Ntambara’s advanced age, declining mental health, and the risk of extended pre-trial incarceration. They further pointed to inconsistencies in witness statements as evidence of weakened case severity.

The court ultimately denied the request for release or suspension, stating that while witness statements contained discrepancies, these were not substantial enough to undermine the seriousness of the charges. The court concluded that the gravity of the alleged crimes outweighed the defendant’s personal circumstances.

Regarding the defense’s investigative requests, the court authorized the appointment of one expert and deferred a decision on the second until the examining magistrate could assess the relevance of their expertise. The next procedural hearing is scheduled for April 17, 2025, at 13:30.